Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. We utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. We impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS seek long-term relationships. Further, some workers may well be more productive than others, and some firms have more productive jobs. The major difference between the marriage market and a labor market is that workers and employers can negotiate over wages; i.e., utility is transferable. Although this is a nontrivial extension, intuition suggests that similar sorting externalities will arise. Lu and McAfee [1995] have used a similar approach to that proposed here to analyze a housing market.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I the basic framework is outlined. In Section II we assume that singles have partially rational expectations. In particular, we assume that singles are perfectly rational except all expect the two current distributions of pizazz among singles in the market to remain constant through time. Given these near rational expectations, we characterize the unique equilibrium for any given pair of flowin distributions. At such an equilibrium it is possible to calculate the distribution of pizazz of each sex among those who leave the market through marriage (or death) each period dt, as well as the number of each sex who leave. If these flow-out distributions and the number who leave equal the exogenous flow-in distributions and number who flow in, the near rational expectations equilibrium is fully rational as the distributions of pizazz among singles in the market will indeed remain constant through time. Conditions that guarantee the existence of such a fully rational steady state equilibrium are established in Section III. In Section IV we discuss some of the many implications and special cases that follow. These examples reveal a rich framework that leads to many testable predictions. In the final section other extensions are briefly discussed.
I. THE FRAMEWORK
Suppose that a large and equal number of single men and single women participate in a marriage market. Let N(t) denote the number (measure) of women in the market at time t (which also equals the number of men). Assume that each individual can be characterized by a real number, the individual's pizazz. The importance of an individual's pizazz can be explained as follows. If a man and a woman decide to marry, the woman's utility from the marriage equals the man's pizazz, whereas the man's utility from the marriage equals the woman's pizazz. It will be shown that the advantage of having high pizazz is that it enables one to attract someone of the opposite sex who also has high pizazz. This assumption, however, rules out narcissism-looking in the mirror to admire one's own pizazz does not increase utility.
Unfortunately, singles in this market face difficulty contacting singles of the opposite sex. Let ox be the arrival rate of singles of the opposite sex faced by a single of either sex, where ox is the parameter of a Poisson process. As ox is assumed to be independent of the number of participating singles, we have what is termed constant returns in the matching function. When two singles of the opposite sex meet, both observe the other's pizazz. If both propose marriage, they form a match and leave the market. There is no search while married. On the other hand, if at least one does not propose, they separate, and both continue to look for a partner.
The life of any individual is described by an exponential random variable with parameter 8 > 0. Hence, Mdt denotes the probability that any individual dies in small time interval dt. To simplify the turnover dynamics, assume that an agent never returns to this market once a match has been formed (including the case when the partner has died). All agents discount at rate r > 0, and assume that both men and women obtain zero utility flow when single.
Let jPdt denote the number of new single men and new single women who enter the market in any time interval dt. Among the set of new entrants at any time, let F.(z) denote the probability any new woman has pizazz no greater than z, whereas Fm(z), denotes the probability any new man has pizazz no greater than z. Keeping things as simple as possible, assume that Fj is twice differentiable and strictly increasing over the interval [X3,X], where xj and wj indicate the infimum and supremum of its support, and Xj > 0, j = s, m.
Of course, the distribution of pizazz among all single women in the market may not equal F.. Let Gj(.,t) denote the distribution of pizazz among single women in the market at time t. Similarly, Gm(.,t) denotes the distribution of pizazz among single men at t. If a single woman meets a single man at time t, then Gm(it) denotes the probability that the single man's pizazz is no greater than z-, whereas if a single man contacts a woman at t, G.(Z-,t) is the probability the woman's pizazz is no greater than i. In this sense search is random.
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II. THE STATIONARY ENVIRONMENT
Throughout this section it is assumed that all singles believe the market can be characterized by (GWIGm), where (Ri) Gj(z,t) = Gw(z) for all z and all t; (R2) Gm(Zlt) = Gm(z) for all z and all t.
Assume that Gj is continuous and has support xj, X-, j = m, W.4 (R1)-(R2) define a stationary market environment. A partial rational expectations equilibrium (PREE) is defined as follows. Conditional on the belief (R1)-(R2), a PREE requires that all agents use utility-maximizing strategies, given the behavior of other agents. We call this "partial" as it may not necessarily be the case that the flow-out of the market, which is generated by the resulting matching behavior, equals the flow-in (described by (FwFm43)). By characterizing a PREE for any (Gw,Gm), Section IV will then identify those (GWIGm) which imply that the flow-out distribution equals the flow-in distribution that therefore identifies all possible steady state equilibria.5
For simplicity, assume that all agents use stationary strategies, where a strategy is a list of people to whom a particular single will propose to on contact.6 Hence, the set of individuals who will propose to a particular single if they make contact is well defined. Let Gw(-I x) denote the distribution of pizazz among single women who will propose to a man with pizazz x if they meet. In a similar fashion, define Gm (-I x) for all x. Further, the arrival rate of proposals faced by a single j with pizazz x at any time t, oXj(x), j = w, m, is also well defined.
Let Uw(x) denote this woman's expected discounted lifetime utility when single. Given that utility x' is obtained if she marries someone with pizazz x', standard dynamic programming arguments imply that Note that (3) describes the reservation match strategy of a woman with pizazz x, given the expected rate of proposals by men. In a PREE the arrival rate of proposals and the conditional offer distribution Gm ( I x) must be consistent with the reservation match strategy of men, described by (4). Similarly for men. Equilibrium immediately implies that the reservation match strategies Rj(Q) are nondecreasing, j = m, w. Any man willing to propose to a woman with pizazz x' is also willing to propose to a woman with pizazz x, where x > x'. By receiving at least the same offers, it follows that Uw(x) -Uw(x'). Hence Rw(x) -Rw(x'). Symmetry implies that Rmn() is also nondecreasing.
The first proposition shows that in a PREE the participants partition themselves into n distinct classes. Proposition 1 shows that a woman in class n will only propose to men who are in the same class or higher, and will always reject a man from a lower class. Men do the same. In equilibrium only men and women from the same class marry. It is now straightforward to construct an induction proof of Proposition 1. Consider a woman not in class 1; i.e., x < yw(l). The crucial insight is that she is automatically rejected by class 1 men, and so the only contacts of interest to her are with those men who are not class 1. This contact rate is given by otGm(ym(1)). Given a random contact, the conditional pizazz distribution of men who are not class 1 is GM(-)/GJ(yJ(1)). Given any continuous distributions (GWGm), let Xmn denote the proportion of men who are in class n, which in a PREE is defined by (9) Xmn = Gm(ym(n -1))-Gm(Ym(n)). which describe the steady state class sizes. Now consider a candidate SSE (GWIGmN). A PREE implies a unique partition ({yw(n)} JwO, {yy(n)} J-,), while balanced flow implies that Gj(.) must satisfy (10) within a class. Using (10) and (12) to substitute out Gj in Proposition 1, it follows that the partition ({yw(n)} J=, {yn(n)} J-0) is part of a SSE if and only if which is the conditional distribution of women's pizazz in this class. Therefore, (15) is simply the steady state analog of (6).
Proposition 2 now gives conditions that fully characterize a SSE. We now provide a formal existence proof of SSE. Unfortunately, there are many difficulties associated with constructing a general fixed point argument (see Smith [1995] for a discussion of those issues). Our proof establishes conditions under which a triple (GWIGmN) can be found that satisfies Proposition 2. To do this, we need to assume that (1 -Fj),j = w, m are log-concave.7 Proposition 3 shows why. Establishing the stability properties of SSE is beyond the scope of this paper. The dynamics are particularly complex. Outside of SSE, the distributions are time varying, which implies that the agents' reservation match strategies are also time varying. Unfortunately, this implies that the offer distributions Gj(z,t I x) are not continuous functions of time.8 Such work is left for future research. In the remainder of the study we explore some of the many implications that follow given the equations of Proposition 2.
IV. EXAMPLES Example 1: The Uniform Distribution
To understand better the mechanics of Proposition 3, we first examine a particularly simple case, where xj is uniformly distributed over [ 
decreasing with n implies that it is discontinuous at the class boundaries where G'(y(n)-) > G'(y(n)+). As this density function is monotonically decreasing, this also implies that the (uniform) distribution of pizazz of entrants first order stochastically dominates the distribution of pizazz of unmatched singles.
Hence this market has two further equilibrium characteristics: high pizazz singles tend to marry and leave the singles market relatively quickly; while unmatched singles notice that there is a greater preponderance of low pizazz members of the opposite sex (relative to their entry distribution).
Example 2: Old Maids and Child Brides
It is not necessarily true that everybody will marry in a SSE if Fm# Fw. To see this, let lij denote the mean of the distribution Fj(.), and suppose that x./puw < xm/[,u. A simple interpretation of this condition is that relative to their own cohorts, the lowest pizazz woman is relatively less desirable than the lowest pizazz man. Now consider cx, where It is straightforward to show that there is a unique solution for y E (x., Y.) and that X.1 E (0, 1) and X.2 = 1 -\W1. In this case, men refuse to marry any woman with pizazz x E [xw, y).10 Further, women in class 1 marry more quickly than men; the marriage rate of such women being (x while that of men is oxkl. As a consequence, women who marry will tend to be younger than their partners, while there are other women who face a zero probability of marriage. Hence, a proportion 'r of all new entrants have high pizazz. We focus on symmetric equilibria, where yj(n) = y(n) and XAn = Xnj = w, m. There are two possible types of such equilibria, characterized by whether high pizazz types are willing to marry low pizazz types or not.
10. An interesting side-issue is that SSE do not exist for these parameter values when 8 = 0. As some women never marry, a positive death rate is necessary for existence. Generic existence with 8 = 0 requires symmetry Fj(-) = F( ), j = m, w.
In any equilibrium high pizazz types will always marry each other on contact. Now suppose that all types expect high pizazz types also to marry low pizazz types on contact. If this is an equilibrium belief, then low pizazz types must also be willing to marry each other.1" Let -9(t) indicate the proportion of singles (of both sexes) who have pizazz XH at time t, while NH(t) = -q(t)N(t) denotes the number of high pizazz types (of each sex) at time t. Given the beliefs described above, N(t) and NH(t) are expected to evolve according to N'(t) = P -(a + 8)N(t) and Ng(t) = frr -(a (jIN(t))O --94) Hence if the contact rate is low enough, those with high pizazz will marry low pizazz types in a steady state equilibrium. We will refer to this equilibrium as a Single Class Equilibrium (SCE).12 Now we change the initial beliefs of these agents. Suppose that all expect high pizazz types will not marry low pizazz types on contact. Again, if this is an equilibrium belief, low pizazz types must be willing to marry each other (remember being single yields zero utility). Given these beliefs, N(t) and NH(t) are now expected to evolve according to N'(t) = P -[8 + ar[j(t)2 + (1 - 1 -j(t))(0.5 -j(t) ). In this case the stationary state is -9(t) = -(jr) and N(t) = N for all t, where 11. Section III showed that in any PREE, the reservation match of any type increases with pizazz.
+ 8)NH(t). Together these imply that Tj'(t) =
_r(t))2]1N(t) and N/t) = frr -[aoj(t) + 8]NH(t). Together these imply that Tj'(t) = (jIN(t))(w -Tj(t)) + 2arj(t)(
12. More formally, assuming (17), G. = F and N = P/(o + 8) satisfy Proposition 2 which imply that X, = 1, y(l) ? XL, and J = 1. 
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with high pizazz is wr. In an EE, however, if IT < 0.5, the proportion of high pizazz singles is greater than ur (but less than 0.5). At the relevant parameters this higher proportion of high pizazz singles justifies them being more selective. On the other hand, at an EE when ar > 0.5, the proportion of high pizazz singles is lower than wr, and therefore cannot at the same time support a SCE. It can be shown that N is larger (there are more singles) in the EE than in the SCE. The greater selectivity of high pizazz types in the EE reduces their own matching rates as well as the matching rates of the low pizazz types. The number of singles has to be greater to ensure that the aggregate matching rate continues to equal the flow in.
The welfare implications of these two steady state equilibria are interesting. These steady states are not Pareto rankable: the high pizazz types prefer the EE; the low pizazz types prefer the SCE. Underpinning these results is a sorting externality. In the SCE a high pizazz type makes other high pizazz agents worse off by being willing to marry low pizazz types. The converse is the case in the EE. Elitist behavior makes the elite better off at the cost of the lower pizazz types. From a utilitarian perspective this is inefficient. The utilitarian Social Planner does not care about who marries whom as marriage rejections simply reduce the total discounted flow of utility. Of course, the high pizazz types are not concerned about that.
Example 4: Uniqueness of Class Equilibria
Given the multiplicity result in the two-types case, we now turn to finding sufficient restrictions that imply uniqueness of a steady state equilibrium. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the symmetric case, where Fj(.) = F(.), j = w, m, and this time set 8 = 0. This is a strong restriction on F.14 However, we conjecture that a weaker assumption does not exist which guarantees 14. Suppose that F'(x) = g(x)/x, where g is a strictly positive, increasing function. Integration implies that F must increase faster than log x. The restriction xF'(x) increasing in x rules out all distributions with unbounded support. Conversely, the uniform distribution satisfies this criterion. Compare this result with the two-types example above. There it was shown that multiple equilibria can occur only if IT < 0.5, as this supports the appropriate feedback effect-that if high pizazz types are choosy, they increase in proportion to the rest of the market. Further, in the EE the restriction wr < 0.5 implies that XA = ij0r) < 0.5 < 1 -(-qrr) = X2; i.e., there is increasing class size. Conversely, ur > 0.5 guarantees uniqueness and also implies decreasing class size in the EE. This suggests that the concept of decreasing class size is closely related to that of uniqueness of SSE. Although not formally established, the proof of Lemma 11 given in the Appendix can be extended to show that xF'(x) increasing in x is also necessary to ensure that class size is decreasing in a SSE for all possible parameter values.15
To understand why decreasing class size is so important for uniqueness, consider the thought experiment that women in class n < J deviate from the steady state and become slightly more choosy and reject men with pizazz x E [y(n), y(n) + E), where E > 0 but arbitrarily small. Consider the first effect of this deviation. The exit rate of the remaining class n men is unchanged. However, the newly rejected men can now only match with class n + 1 women, and crucially their exit rate changes a discrete amount from aXn to Xn+1i. If Xn+1 > Xn (the case of increasing class size), the first effect of this deviation is that these types exit more quickly and so their numbers decline. Hence, the conditional steady state distribution Gm(x I x E [y(n), y(n -1))) with this deviation first-order stochastically dominates the original one. This implies that the reservation match quality of class n women does indeed increase which potentially supports multiple equilibria. Conversely, if Xn+1 < Xn, the newly rejected types exit even more slowly and hence build up relatively more in number. The shift in the distribution of pizazz of men in class n causes class n women's 15. If a is arbitrarily large, it can be shown that the class widths [y(n), y(n -1)) become arbitrarily small. If xF'(x) is strictly decreasing in x over some nonempty interval, it follows by the proof of Lemma 11 that the classes in this interval must be strictly increasing in size. reservation match to decrease, which does not support the original supposed increase. Guaranteeing uniqueness requires a relatively severe restriction on F which ensures decreasing class size.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a simple proof for why class partitions may arise in a marriage market with two-sided heterogeneity. With exogenous inflows of new agents, we have shown that there are sorting externalities which can support multiple class equilibria, even when there are constant returns to matching.
There are several directions for future research. For simplicity, this paper has focused on characterizing steady state equilibria and has shown that guaranteeing uniqueness requires some strong restrictions. Characterizing the nonsteady state dynamics about such steady state equilibria is an important, though difficult extension. Smith [1995] has examined equilibrium dynamics when there is no inflow of new agents, while Burdett and Coles [1995] have done this for the two-types case described above. They find that when two steady state equilibria exist, both of them are stable. Indeed, for some initial values, they show that there are multiple dynamic equilibria.
Another important extension is to allow singles to bargain over the surplus of the match. This, of course, describes a simple labor market situation. Initial work indicates that the sorting externality identified here can support multiple equilibria. This potentially provides new insights into how the labor market might segment when there are heterogeneous firms and workers. A further direction is to endogenize the flow-in distributions of pizazz in different ways. Two variations appear interesting at first blush. One is to assume that agents are born with some pizazz drawn from some exogenous distribution, but at some cost can obtain greater pizazz. It is the postpurchase distributions of pizazz that flows into the marriage market. Given the class partition result, if a single purchases pizazz, he or she only buys that which puts them at the lower bound of a higher class-there is no benefit to purchasing any more within a class. This suggests that clustering will occur at class boundaries. Another variation is to assume that when a couple marries they have two children whose pizazz is a weighted average of their parents' pizazz. In this case the pizazz distributions of singles will evolve through time depending on previous marriage decisions. 
